Freud’s Three Essays On the Theory of Sexuality
In Essay #1 of Freud’s Three Essays on Sexuality, Freud implements numerous edits to the concept of the “sexual object.” He states that overvaluation of the sexual object that is the primary genitalia leads to perversion, which can be “positive” or “negative.” The positive perversion is characteristic of viewing a mate’s entire body as a sexual entity, which is widely socially acceptable. Conversely, negative perversion deviates from the norm by substituting the drive for the primary genitalia for that of a solitary part of the body. Thus it appears a normative sexual view is that in which the whole body becomes object – the “whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” What’s wrong with this idea of a spectrum of perversion/sexual fetishism? In other words, why is it more acceptable to fetishize the entire body than a single component of it?
In essay #2, Freud touches on the childish idea of “I’ll show you mine if you show me yours” as a sort of precursor to voyeurism. Moreover, he states that voyeurism, in the perverse sense, beckons reciprocity as well, as the voyeur is too an exhibitionist at all times. Are these innate forms of reciprocity in anyway analogous to that of capitalist and/or gift exchange? Could this inherent existence of sexual reciprocity be the subconscious root of these more modern forms of exchange?
In essay #3 Freud implies that our parents provide the model for our future mates/objects of desire. Then to what extent is dating/the search for a mate simply a matching game, consisting of finding identical parts?
“Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence”
I was particularly intrigued by the author's use of the word "artful" to describe the mechanisms of disavowal of reality and fetishism as "displacement" of value. In what ways are these mechanisms analogous to the craft of artwork? And if similar, is it the subconscious process or the manifestations themselves?
~Jordan Carter~
Monday, November 10, 2008
Freud Questions from Crow
1.) At the top of page 14, Freud derails a set of assumptions that had been operating in his analysis of inversion in order to allow for the many varied instances of "frequent" yet not "normal" occurrences, showing a disconnect between sexual instinct and sexual object. He has not yet established the idea that these sexual instincts appear to be influenced by sexual stimulation and parental affection in the infantile state, and after the period of latency during puberty in a further repression, and only then bringing about the possibility of fetishization. Even further, he goes on to reflect that the infantile stage is characterized by autoeroticism, which would seem to set up the self as the sexual object (if not the mothers breast etc.), which makes me wonder: What would Freud say about the fetishization of the self? Does that at all fit in with the ideas he is proposing?
2.) I find it hard to reconcile Freud's insistence that infantile sex instincts are autoerotic while he is incessantly (if not explicitly) pointing to the external factors for which bodily stimulation merely acts as emulation in the case of non-genital erotogenic zones (such as parental influence, the manipulation of seduction, the substitution of the thumb for the breast, etc.) Also, (how) can autoeroticism exist in notably penisless females? (bringing in ideas established in the other essays.)
3.) To what extent is it significant that the sexual object as fetish resulting from - among other factors in the two waves of sexual object preference - repression is necessarily unobtainable, in that the sexual appetite can be temporarily quenched, presenting periods during which sexual objects do not have desirability for normative instances of genital stimulation in the fashion of reproductive activity.
4.) Is this rift in the ego what might be considered depravity, neurosis, or perversion according to Freud's earlier works? Would these be abnormal tendencies, or do they find a parallel in fine line walked by the loving parent who stands to lose by faulting to either side of perfect balance of display of affection? Does the boy need to continue to hallucinate a penis, continue to masturbate, and simultaneously fear and deny the possibility of castration?
2.) I find it hard to reconcile Freud's insistence that infantile sex instincts are autoerotic while he is incessantly (if not explicitly) pointing to the external factors for which bodily stimulation merely acts as emulation in the case of non-genital erotogenic zones (such as parental influence, the manipulation of seduction, the substitution of the thumb for the breast, etc.) Also, (how) can autoeroticism exist in notably penisless females? (bringing in ideas established in the other essays.)
3.) To what extent is it significant that the sexual object as fetish resulting from - among other factors in the two waves of sexual object preference - repression is necessarily unobtainable, in that the sexual appetite can be temporarily quenched, presenting periods during which sexual objects do not have desirability for normative instances of genital stimulation in the fashion of reproductive activity.
4.) Is this rift in the ego what might be considered depravity, neurosis, or perversion according to Freud's earlier works? Would these be abnormal tendencies, or do they find a parallel in fine line walked by the loving parent who stands to lose by faulting to either side of perfect balance of display of affection? Does the boy need to continue to hallucinate a penis, continue to masturbate, and simultaneously fear and deny the possibility of castration?
QQQQQQQQQQQQQ
In Freud's description of shit as the child's "gift," feces become a peculiar possession. Since it is of the body, it aligns in some sense with Locke's sense of the body as one's own possession. Yet shit is constantly disavowed, expelled, controlled. Is the fuss over potty training, over creating the division between 'clean' and 'dirty' for the child, really just the beginning of property management? Is a tutorial in loss (of physical mass, of power, of emotion)? How does this relate to Freud's description of 'toxic substances' in the third essay (81-82)? How does the formlessness of shit in Freud relate to the formlessness of spit in My Cocaine Museum's poporo? Given the emotional significance of both processes, it seems that formless human discharge becomes twice a site of inscription.
How does Freud's description of the male child's train obsession and the significance of mechanical rhythm in bodily sensation locate the human body among machines?
Freud qualifies the acts of touching and looking by putting them on a trajectory that culminates in genital intercourse; they're perverse if not consummated ["So that lingering over the stage of touching can scarcely be counted a perversion, provided that in the long run the sexual act is carried further" (22)]. When considering the fetishization of objects, could one set up a similar system, where the concept of 'proper use' is aligned with Freud's telos of intercourse, and anything that falls short is considered perverse? Is the book collector who surveys his goods, marvels at the colors, strokes the spines, but never reads a word a pervert? A scopophiliac? It seems that many could consider him greedy or philistine or plain wrong in the way he considers his objects.
- Emily
How does Freud's description of the male child's train obsession and the significance of mechanical rhythm in bodily sensation locate the human body among machines?
Freud qualifies the acts of touching and looking by putting them on a trajectory that culminates in genital intercourse; they're perverse if not consummated ["So that lingering over the stage of touching can scarcely be counted a perversion, provided that in the long run the sexual act is carried further" (22)]. When considering the fetishization of objects, could one set up a similar system, where the concept of 'proper use' is aligned with Freud's telos of intercourse, and anything that falls short is considered perverse? Is the book collector who surveys his goods, marvels at the colors, strokes the spines, but never reads a word a pervert? A scopophiliac? It seems that many could consider him greedy or philistine or plain wrong in the way he considers his objects.
- Emily
Patrick's Questions
"The Sexual Aberrations"
"A certain degree of fetishism is thus habitually present in normal love, especially in those stages of it in which the normal sexual aim seems unattainable or its fulfillment prevented" (20)
Although Freud lays out the conditions under which fetishism becomes a pathology (when "the fetish . . . takes the place of a normal aim," and "when the fetish becomes detached from a particular individual and becomes the sole sexual object"), how might Freud's conception of the "sexual object" reintroduce the pathological in the normal? Or, in Derridean terms, can the concept of "fetish" be controlled, limited, expunged from the normal, or is it a sort of dangerous supplement?
"Infantile Sexuality"
I was particularly struck by Freud's concept of infantile amnesia. What is the role of nostalgia in this formulation? Is the retrieval of a repressed trauma nostalgic? Is there a nostalgia for a certain kind of continuity? For knowledge?
"Transformations of Puberty"
"A child's affection for his parents is no doubt the most important infantile trace which, after being revived at puberty, points the way to his choice of an object" (94).
How might we read Freud's emphasis on parents' role other than as a statement of fact? For example, as an effect of his milieu? As a legitimating myth?
"Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence"
What interested me in this essay is not necessarily the specifics of the boy's case, but the way in which repression is formulated. In order to continue masturbating, the boy must repress his fear of castration, which emerges later as a symptom. My question: Is desire formulated as some kind of substance, as matter? Can the ego be similarly imagined as material?
"A certain degree of fetishism is thus habitually present in normal love, especially in those stages of it in which the normal sexual aim seems unattainable or its fulfillment prevented" (20)
Although Freud lays out the conditions under which fetishism becomes a pathology (when "the fetish . . . takes the place of a normal aim," and "when the fetish becomes detached from a particular individual and becomes the sole sexual object"), how might Freud's conception of the "sexual object" reintroduce the pathological in the normal? Or, in Derridean terms, can the concept of "fetish" be controlled, limited, expunged from the normal, or is it a sort of dangerous supplement?
"Infantile Sexuality"
I was particularly struck by Freud's concept of infantile amnesia. What is the role of nostalgia in this formulation? Is the retrieval of a repressed trauma nostalgic? Is there a nostalgia for a certain kind of continuity? For knowledge?
"Transformations of Puberty"
"A child's affection for his parents is no doubt the most important infantile trace which, after being revived at puberty, points the way to his choice of an object" (94).
How might we read Freud's emphasis on parents' role other than as a statement of fact? For example, as an effect of his milieu? As a legitimating myth?
"Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence"
What interested me in this essay is not necessarily the specifics of the boy's case, but the way in which repression is formulated. In order to continue masturbating, the boy must repress his fear of castration, which emerges later as a symptom. My question: Is desire formulated as some kind of substance, as matter? Can the ego be similarly imagined as material?
Kristen's Questions on Freud
Q1
Freud discusses the abnormalities regarding gender, referring to gender not being only male and female. He states how these abnormalities "facilitate our understanding of normal development"(7). How are fetishes (discussed later in the text) classified as normal and abnormal, and if they are even talked about in terms of normalcy? Do fetishes also require a comparison of abnormal to define them?
Q2
"That it finds its object in the infant's own body" (63). This quote is referring to infants finding objects in themselves, which seems to be active. However, throughout the text, female is referred to passive, while the male is referred to as active. How does this relate to infants?
Q3
In sec 5 of Essay III, there is the discussion of finding the object. There is assigning of the object to the self, as well as to the other. The object assigned to the self is pre-puberty, and seeing an object in others is after puberty. But is it possible to see the object in oneself in adulthood?
Q4 (Xerox article #2)
How do women experience and develop fetishes? The article only explains how men do, through the fear of castration because of seeing a woman.
Freud discusses the abnormalities regarding gender, referring to gender not being only male and female. He states how these abnormalities "facilitate our understanding of normal development"(7). How are fetishes (discussed later in the text) classified as normal and abnormal, and if they are even talked about in terms of normalcy? Do fetishes also require a comparison of abnormal to define them?
Q2
"That it finds its object in the infant's own body" (63). This quote is referring to infants finding objects in themselves, which seems to be active. However, throughout the text, female is referred to passive, while the male is referred to as active. How does this relate to infants?
Q3
In sec 5 of Essay III, there is the discussion of finding the object. There is assigning of the object to the self, as well as to the other. The object assigned to the self is pre-puberty, and seeing an object in others is after puberty. But is it possible to see the object in oneself in adulthood?
Q4 (Xerox article #2)
How do women experience and develop fetishes? The article only explains how men do, through the fear of castration because of seeing a woman.
Ryan's Traumatic Freudian Slips
1. Sexual Aberrations
At the outset, Freud “Let us call the person from whom sexual attraction proceeds the sexual object and the act towards which the instinct tends the sexual aim.” (1-2). He later argues, “We are thus warned to loosen the bond that exists in our thoughts between instinct and object. It seems probably that the sexual instinct is in the first instance independent of its object; nor is its origin likely to be due to its object’s attractions.” (14). Does drive, therefore, “create” the object? Are object relations a “function” of drive?
2.Infantile Sexuality
“To begin with, sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the purpose of self-preservation and does not become independent of them until later...the need for repeating the sexual satisfaction now becomes detached from the need...” (48). This shift, the process whereby satisfaction can become “detached” from need, evidences a shift in understandings of childhood sexuality: how does it also suggest a dynamic process for refiguring object relations?
3.Puberty
“at a time at which the first beginnings of sexual satisfaction
are still linked with the taking of nourishment, the sexual
instinct has a sexual object outside the infant’s own body...the sexual instinct then becomes auto-erotic...The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it” (88)
Given this trajectory (with elisions, for space’s sake), doesn’t Freud’s model seem to set up two concepts of drive, where one suggests that libido could emerge as an independent force, and the other emphasizes earlier object relations? Or is this a model where these aspects are in productive tension? Is this related to, or distinct from the nagging presence of nostalgia (Stewart) and the imprint of loss (Weiner)?
Fetishism (1928)
“the boy had refused to take cognizance of the fact perceived by him that woman has no penis. No, that cannot be true...” (162)
Here, Freud sets up the idea of disavowal, or perhaps, to be more correct, a process where a given reality is simultaneously acknowledged and denied. Marx’s process of commodity fetishism also involves an operation upon acknowledgement, upon conditions of knowledge. How do they contrast?
***agreed, Hollis, page 88 continues to reign supreme...
At the outset, Freud “Let us call the person from whom sexual attraction proceeds the sexual object and the act towards which the instinct tends the sexual aim.” (1-2). He later argues, “We are thus warned to loosen the bond that exists in our thoughts between instinct and object. It seems probably that the sexual instinct is in the first instance independent of its object; nor is its origin likely to be due to its object’s attractions.” (14). Does drive, therefore, “create” the object? Are object relations a “function” of drive?
2.Infantile Sexuality
“To begin with, sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the purpose of self-preservation and does not become independent of them until later...the need for repeating the sexual satisfaction now becomes detached from the need...” (48). This shift, the process whereby satisfaction can become “detached” from need, evidences a shift in understandings of childhood sexuality: how does it also suggest a dynamic process for refiguring object relations?
3.Puberty
“at a time at which the first beginnings of sexual satisfaction
are still linked with the taking of nourishment, the sexual
instinct has a sexual object outside the infant’s own body...the sexual instinct then becomes auto-erotic...The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it” (88)
Given this trajectory (with elisions, for space’s sake), doesn’t Freud’s model seem to set up two concepts of drive, where one suggests that libido could emerge as an independent force, and the other emphasizes earlier object relations? Or is this a model where these aspects are in productive tension? Is this related to, or distinct from the nagging presence of nostalgia (Stewart) and the imprint of loss (Weiner)?
Fetishism (1928)
“the boy had refused to take cognizance of the fact perceived by him that woman has no penis. No, that cannot be true...” (162)
Here, Freud sets up the idea of disavowal, or perhaps, to be more correct, a process where a given reality is simultaneously acknowledged and denied. Marx’s process of commodity fetishism also involves an operation upon acknowledgement, upon conditions of knowledge. How do they contrast?
***agreed, Hollis, page 88 continues to reign supreme...
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